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Peacebuilding and Lines of Friction between Imagined Communities in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and South Africa 
 
Words: 8343 
 
Stefanie Kappler
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Abstract 
With specific reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina and South Africa, this article 
looks at how peacebuilding actors constantly recreate public space and the discourses 
within it. The formation of imagined political communities reflects the extent to 
which peacebuilding interactions can be rather horizontal or vertical in nature, 
producing different types of friction in the encounter between peacebuilding actors. In 
Bosnia, the predominantly horizontal nature of international peacebuilding processes 
has resulted in the emergence of fragmented local sub-spaces. Those are often in 
conflict with international and national political communities, with frictions emerging 
between local, national and international actor networks. The article will contrast 
those processes with the mosaic developing in South Africa, where boundaries 
between actors are more blurred. Due to strong vertical cooperation, sporadic frictions 
tend to emerge within those spaces rather than exclusively at their boundaries. The 
article will analyse the extent to which different patterns of peacebuilding interaction 
impact upon the constructive and destructive frictions that those produce.  
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Introduction 
                                                        
1 Many thanks to Annika Björkdahl, Kristine Höglund, the International Development 
Department at the University of Birmingham (in particular Nicolas LeMay-Hébert, Jonathan 
Fisher and Paul Jackson) and two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. 
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Having conducted research in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 2008 to research 
local and international peacebuilding, I was struck by the apparent deadlock of the 
peacebuilding process and the seemingly small degree of change in the ways in which 
society reflects war and peace. Two subsequent visits to South Africa presented a 
different picture – more explosive, yet more dynamic, with discourses about peace 
and conflict penetrating multiple societal and political spheres. Reflecting the 
dynamic nature of frictions between diverse sets of peacebuilding actors, these 
observations tie in with Tsing’s conceptualisation of frictions as arising “out of 
encounters and interactions.”2 They shed light on the multi-faceted nature of global 
connections as well as the different localities developing from those local-global 
encounters.
3
 
The emergence of a set or network of actors as imagined socio-political 
communities illustrates the location and nature of frictions in each of those two 
contexts, reaching across societal levels. Those imagined communities highlight the 
fact that local, national and international actors are inextricably linked. At the same 
time, the boundaries between different categories of actors (local, civil society, 
national, international) are subject to constant re-negotiation in the formation of 
frictions and bridges between and within those categories. Thus, rather than 
essentialising peacebuilding landscapes and structures, this article attempts a snapshot 
of the formation of imagined communities to point at frictional tendencies of 
interaction, their destructive and constructive nature. The article will outline the 
predominantly horizontal political communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
4
 before 
casting light on the verticalisation of community-formation in the case of South 
Africa. However, this does not represent an attempt to romanticise emerging imagined 
communities in those two case studies by presenting those communities as stable and 
homogeneous. Instead, the article investigates the processes during the course of 
which multiple boundaries between imagined communities are negotiated and 
frictions are constantly (re-)enacted, vertically and horizontally. This approach will 
outline the tendencies through which political communities continuously integrate and 
disintegrate to make their voices and needs heard in the negotiation of peace and 
peacebuilding.  
                                                        
2
 Anna L. Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), xi. 
3
 Cf. Tsing, Friction, 1. 
4
 From here onwards BiH or Bosnia. 
 3 
It can be said that Bosnia represents one of the more typical case studies in the 
field of peacebuilding, not only because it is referred to as such in the literature, but 
also quite visibly in the light of the heavy involvement of a set of international actors 
in the micropolitics and processes of governance in the country. The latter are often 
assumed to be conflict-prone and in need of international assistance to lead to peace at 
all societal levels. Against this background, one may wonder about the extent to 
which South Africa can be considered a peacebuilding case at all, given that for 
many, development issues appear to be more pressing than peacebuilding in the 
narrow sense. In South Africa, however, issues of development, poverty, 
discrimination, social justice and criminality are the markers through which social 
engagement is typically characterised. Those issues represent the discursive 
frameworks through which peace-related engagement is framed in the country. 
Looking at the very recent history of South Africa, it does become evident that 
discussions about a peaceful future for the country are closely linked to the (in)ability 
to include the poor and marginalised with political debates and, more generally, the 
ways in which issues of social justice are addressed. In this context, people most 
affected by these issues emphasised that material deprivation is likely to lead to 
criminality, violence and continued unrest.
5
  
Research undertaken for this article is based on multiple visits to Bosnia 
between 2008 and 2011 as well as two research visits to South Africa in 2012. The 
case studies shed light on two alternative processes of community formation and the 
production of frictions in the peacebuilding landscape. In that sense, the article will 
not suggest that Bosnia and South Africa represent analogous or parallel cases of 
peacebuilding. Instead, I am using those two case studies to test the value of the 
concept of ‘friction’ in two very different contexts, to investigate the extent to which 
the concept can account for the difference in historicity, nature of the conflict and 
associated peacebuilding efforts, understood as an interplay between imagined 
communities. 
 
 
 
Friction between ‘Imagined Communities’ 
                                                        
5
 Township elder, personal interview, Malawi Town, 07/09/12. 
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To illustrate the fluid boundaries at which frictions emerge, we need to revisit 
Anderson’s idea of ‘imagined communities’.6 This involves an understanding of a set 
of actors as a community if the actors included define themselves as such by 
imagining their role as part of a cluster or network of agency (e.g. an elite community, 
a grassroots community, an international community). Those networks and their 
boundaries are subject to constant renegotiation and can thus only be grasped in the 
context of their surrounding processes in cultural and social spheres. The strongest 
community affiliation is always context-dependent. In contrast to Anderson’s 
reference to imagined political communities as limited and sovereign entities,
7
 I claim 
that the definition of ‘imagined communities’ does not only apply to more or less 
autonomous nation-states. Instead, the concept can be extended to any political 
network with varying degrees of autonomy and sovereignty.
8
 In that sense, an 
imagined community in the understanding of this article is any set of actors who act 
with a high degree of coherence and understand themselves as a joint network of 
actors. This includes a perception of one’s group as sharing a set of values, norms and 
a common sense of belonging. At the same time, any actor is part of multiple 
imagined communities, which may or may not be in conflict with each other. 
 
The concept of friction is a metaphor that would usually be found in Physics,
9
 
representing a metaphor to conceptualise the encounter of substances. Similar to 
encounters of groups of actors, it can be considered a type of resistance and does not 
only occur between solids, but also between fluids. When two non-similar substances 
meet, they dissipate energy, mostly in the form of heat, which in turn means that those 
substances are affected by that friction and change. Generally, friction is needed to 
enable movement, so it can be conceptualised as a transformational process. It is 
therefore a condition for change and transformation. In that sense, the metaphor of 
friction can be viewed as the encounter of (fluid) imagined communities resisting and 
impacting on each other, while producing energy and continuous change. Frictional 
                                                        
6
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London; New York: Verso, 1991). 
7
 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 6. 
8 Cf. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005).  
9 I would like to thank Matteo Broggi and Pierre Beaurepaire for familiarising me with the notion 
of friction in Physics. 
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peacebuilding thus creates energy which can be constructive or deconstructive, but is 
always transformational due to the impact that actors have on each other. 
 
Perhaps ironically, peacebuilding policies generally assume a gradual 
rapprochement of local actors to what is perceived as universal norms and thus imply 
a friction-free nature of local-international interaction, despite an emphasis on 
difference between ‘local’ and ‘international’.10 In that sense, peacebuilding assumes 
that a more or less coherent international community will be able to transform a 
conflict-torn civil society into a coherent and peaceful one. International 
peacebuilding actors often seem to assume that conflict emerges from frictions at the 
local and state level respectively. When addressing the situation in BiH, for instance, 
the EU’s key words to describe local conditions include notions of ‘problems’, 
‘failure’, ‘very little progress’, ‘difficulties’ etc.11 In a similar vein, a recent report of 
the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on BiH points to 
frictions inside the political system, specifically with respect to  
 
the inadequacy of assistance provided to non-war related beneficiaries and 
discrimination resulting from significant discrepancies in the protection afforded to war-
related categories in comparison to others; as well as from the distinctly different stance of 
the entity governments towards the different groups.
12
  
 
International intervention is then expected to overcome those frictions, 
creating a tension-free landscape of actors.  
At the same time, actors discursively create those boundaries to reaffirm their 
own community group as well as how those relate to other imagined communities. 
Those boundaries must not be considered as stable, but are in constant discursive 
renegotiation. In this context, Björkdahl has outlined the extent to which frictions are 
inherent to any process of localisation, while the latter emerges when global norms 
                                                        
10
 Cf. Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992). 
11
 Cf. European Commission, “Commission staff working document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 
Progress Report, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council” (Brussels, 2010). 
12
 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Right to Social Protection in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 2012), 16. 
 6 
are absorbed locally, and vice versa.
13
 Processes of inclusion and exclusion are part of 
those processes of localisation and their contextual (re-)negotiations. In these 
processes, certain actors are made part of an imagined community, while others are 
excluded from it. Against this background, critical peacebuilding literature has started 
to question the assumed friction-free nature of the international level itself. This body 
of literature has argued that friction may produce a variety of outcomes, generally 
conceptualised as ‘hybrid peacebuilding.’14  
 
Imagined communities, local, national and international, are thus in a 
potentially frictional relationship each other, whether that friction be in the form of 
adaption, co-option, resistance or rejection. However, the fact that imagined 
communities are situated in shared webs of significance
15
 means that actors’ identities 
strongly derive from meanings created within these multiple webs of significance. 
These processes become particularly complex when actors are part of multiple 
imagined communities. The production of cultures - in the ways in which 
communities interact - facilitates the emergence of frictions, or in Tsing’s words, “the 
awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across 
difference.”16 The creation of difference in turn is not limited to vertical processes in 
the sense of top-down governance, but also happens horizontally. The non-linearity of 
those frictions has to be accounted for, given that vertical divisions can only be 
grasped in the light of horizontal dynamics, and vice versa. Horizontal and vertical 
friction is always linked. Without implying direct causality, it can be said that 
channels of communication that may be blocked vertically may, for instance, support 
the emergence of horizontal channels, while weak horizontal links may facilitate a 
stronger vertical orientation of the actors involved in peacebuilding. The very nature 
of those frictions and cleavages can be considered crucial to understanding the 
dynamics of interaction within peacebuilding contexts as well as the thus emerging 
relationships between various sets of actors. At the same time, this means that we 
must not only investigate frictions in the light of global connections, as Tsing 
                                                        
13
 Annika Björkdahl, ”A Gender-Just Peace: Exploring the Post-Dayton Peace Process”, Journal of 
Peace and Change 37, no.2 (2012): 286-317, p.292. 
14
 Roger Mac Ginty, International peacebuilding and local resistance: hybrid forms of peace (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds.), Hybrid Forms of 
Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011). 
15
 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London: Fontana Press, 1993). 
16
 Cf. Tsing, Friction, 4. 
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suggests, but we have to account for friction as a process of local just as much as 
global connectedness, in the light of the energy that is produced through local-global 
encounters. 
 
 
Vertical frictions and Horizontalisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be said to have taken on a 
trusteeship style. The transition from war to peace (or what is labelled as such) was a 
process heavily directed by international actors and involved local actors mainly as 
signatories of externally devised peace agreements. Still today, intervention is 
international, mainly through the European Union (EU), the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), the OSCE, but also through the engagement of individual 
states – first and foremost the United States. Even 17 years after the end of the war in 
BiH, peacebuilding remains muscular, while Bosnia’s domestic affairs reflect a strong 
international dimension. This approach is linked to the assumption that frictions at the 
local level can only be overcome through external guidance.
17
  
What the following section will show is the gradual emergence and 
solidification of horizontal imagined communities and the resulting development of 
vertical frictions in BiH. As a result, actors tend to articulate and channel their needs 
horizontally. Vertical links do exist, but tend to be scarce and often blocked. Again, 
this is not an attempt to essentialise the emergence of communities, but rather to 
outline some tendencies through which they have become integrated internally. 
 
The International Community 
Looking at the international community, it can be said that it is often 
perceived as one group, both locally and from within that community. Indeed, 
although different international actors pursue a variety of agendas, it seems that the 
EU has gradually been taking over the role of the agenda-setter. As early as 2008, the 
World Bank in Sarajevo was determined to align to EU conditionality in the design of 
its programmes.
18
 Similarly, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 
Bosnia made clear that they support EU integration, promoting, for instance, the EU’s 
                                                        
17
 Stefan Simosas, Office of the High Representative, personal interview, Sarajevo, 08/03/11. 
18
 Marco Mantovanelli, World Bank, personal interview, Sarajevo, 10/03/08. 
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standards of social inclusion and cooperation.
19
 The EU itself also seems to base its 
actions on a cooperative way of working with other international actors in the 
country.  A political advisor to the EU Delegation to Bosnia-Herzegovina quoted the 
process of passing civil service laws in 2003, which she considered an efficient 
process, given the support the EU received from the OHR.
20
 Given that, as a general 
rule, the process of passing laws in BiH can take years due to the complex power-
sharing arrangements, the fact that those civil service laws consolidated within only a 
few months was considered a success. However, the imagination of international 
actors as an almost friction-free community of actors is not just a product of those 
institutional forms of cooperation, but also of the ways in which the international 
community is portrayed locally. When speaking about the international community in 
everyday life discourses, people do not tend to differentiate between different 
agencies.
21
 There is a more general notion of the group of “internationals”, a term 
which comes with heavy baggage as a result of the perceived failure of any 
international actors to end the violence before the end of violence in 1995. Not least 
as a result of that failure, international actors are perceived as distant from ordinary 
people’s lives, while the latter picture the former as distant and, as with all that is 
distant, as more or less homogeneous. This perceived detachment is closely linked to 
a rather sceptical view of international peacebuilding more generally. A political 
advisor to the EU Delegation himself pointed to the Delegation’s awareness of a 
growing animosity towards EU on the ground.
22
 In that sense, there are not many 
attempts by local actors to break through the shell of international agency, while the 
latter remains in a more or less isolated arena, with its own culture in friction with the 
surrounding ‘local’ environment.  
 
The Political Class 
These centripetal forces also play out in the political class – perhaps 
surprisingly against the background that one expects to deal with a deeply ethnically 
segregated landscape shaped by ethnicised political communities. However, several 
meetings in parliament with politicians from competing political parties reflected a 
strong sense of unity among the interviewees. Rather than arguing against each other, 
                                                        
19
 Staff member, UNDP, personal interview, Sarajevo, 03/09/09. 
20
 Political advisor, EU Delegation to BiH, personal interview, Sarajevo, 03/03/11. 
21
 This became obvious throughout months of field work in Bosnia, spread out between 2008 and 2011. 
22
 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, EU Delegation to BiH, personal interview, Sarajevo, 08/03/10. 
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in all of those meetings the interviewees agreed on many central issues and indeed 
behaved like allies rather than as political opponents.
23
 It has to be taken into account 
that the constitution itself forces different political actors to cooperate if they want to 
move anything. The Dayton Peace Agreement in which the constitution is embedded 
clearly envisages concerted action between the three majority ethnic groups as each of 
them holds veto rights.
24
  
Similarly, the EU has a strong interest in having one single interlocutor, both 
from the perspective of the local Delegation as well as from Brussels.
25
 In that sense, 
EU accession presupposes a friction-free political landscape, coherent local structures 
and, to a certain extent, requires that landscape to be integrative.
26
 The European 
Parliament’s recent progress report on BiH indeed confirms the requirement for a 
single (rather than divided) country to enter the EU.
27
 This in turn implies the 
requirement to overcome frictions between different political parties and their socio-
geographical divisions. This is of course not to say that the political class is free from 
horizontal frictions. To the contrary, the difficulties in forming a government after the 
2010 elections reflected the extent to which divisions shape Bosnia’s political 
landscape. It took fourteen months for political parties to agree on the formation of a 
government, which did in fact block the state considerably. However, Bosnians from 
a variety of backgrounds, and particularly in the Federation, would often tell me that 
“our politicians are all the same”, “they are all corrupt” and “I do not want to get 
involved with those people”. People tend to see politicians as mutual allies who are all 
equally corrupt and not interested in the welfare of Bosnian citizens.  
Some politicians seem to be aware of this problem, admitting that they cannot 
fulfil citizens’ expectations28 and that there is a lack of citizens’ engagement with 
public debates.
29
 To a large extent, this coincides with the view of many international 
                                                        
23
 Personal meetings in national parliament: with representatives from SDP BiH, SBiH, SDA, SDS, 
Sarajevo, 10/03/09; meeting in parliament, Sarajevo, 13/03/08; meeting in parliament, Sarajevo, 
07/03/11. 
24
 See Dayton Peace Agreement, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380 (accessed 
11/10/12).  
25
 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, EU Delegation to BiH, personal interview, Sarajevo, 08/03/10. 
26
 Cf. Stefanie Kappler, “Centrifugal Peacebuilding and Divergent Transformation”, International 
Peacekeeping 19, no.5 (2012): 612-27 and Audra Mitchell, Lost in Transformation: Peace and Radical 
Change in Northern Ireland (PhD thesis: Queens University of Belfast, 2009). 
27
 European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2012 on the 2011 progress report on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Strasbourg, 2012. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0085+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 11/10/12). 
28
 Nermina Zaimovic-Uzunovic, SDP, personal interview, Sarajevo, 07/03/11. 
29
 Selim Beslovic, SDP, personal interview, Sarajevo, 10/03/09. 
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actors of Bosnian politics, which are perceived as largely driven by the media, with 
the latter not living up to high quality standards.
30
 Such perceptions are reflected in 
the statement of an OHR advisor who argues that people do not necessarily vote in 
their interest, but are often fooled by the media.
31
 Without necessarily agreeing with 
this statement, it can still be argued that the media act as instruments of political 
parties rather than translating and mediating between different sets of actors, e.g. 
politicians and the local population. There are certainly exceptions to this, such as the 
Balkans Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), but by and large, the most widely 
consumed media stations do not strengthen vertical links between different imagined 
communities in BiH. As a result of this perceived distance between the political 
sphere from people’s everyday lives, there is a strong feeling among local 
communities that politics is not serving their interests.
32
 A Bosnian student remarked 
that “everybody has problems with politics here, but no one is trying to change that. 
People only complain.”33 Indeed, due to the frustration with the ways in which 
politics are developed in BiH, people have withdrawn from that sphere. Most 
Bosnians would not tend to approach the government with their grievances and most 
pressing needs, but will instead channel those issues into family and neighbourhood 
circles. This results in a growing distance between the grassroots and political elites, 
further contributing to the cementation of horizontal imagined communities at the 
expense of vertical links. Friction thus emerges between the political class and the 
local population, while it has to be said that although there is a strong cohesion within 
the political class itself as well as the international community, those two 
communities do connect.
34
 This is partly due to the fact that Bosnian politicians and 
international agencies are forced to cooperate to a certain extent in a system of mutual 
dependence. Yet those connections tend to be selective and instrumental, while there 
are only few connections between those communities and the grassroots, as the article 
will continue to show. 
 
Civil society 
                                                        
30
 Interview with five staff members, EU Delegation to BiH, personal interview, Sarajevo, 15/03/10. 
31
 Staff member, OHR, personal interview, Sarajevo, 16/03/10. 
32
 Ingrid Halbritter, Pharos, personal interview, Sarajevo, 15/03/08.  
33
 Mirza Ajnadcic, EFM student radio, personal interview, Sarajevo, 07/03/11. 
34
 Kappler, “Centrifugal Peacebuilding and Divergent Transformation”. 
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Even in the arena of civil society organisations, there is a tendency to form 
strong communities horizontally. On the one hand, civil society actors compete for 
funding, which at times leads to divisions within the civil society sector. On the other 
hand, civil society actors in BiH are generally mutually networked and do joint 
projects. The Mreza za Izgradnju Mira (Network for Building Peace) is but one 
example of the increasing strengthening of the civil society community.
35
 It can also 
be said that many people are involved in a number of civil society organisations 
and/or movements at the same time. This can take different shapes and forms: It is not 
unusual to meet someone who has worked for a variety of NGOs, who has set up 
different networks and ways of strengthening civil society cooperation and generally 
knows most people active in the field of civil society in BiH. Some people tend to use 
the money and contacts gained in the work for an externally funded NGO to support 
activities that they care about most in their private time.
36
 It is therefore common to 
be involved in the creation and administration of several NGOs at a time, which in 
turn strengthens the community-feeling of NGOs even more. The dissemination of 
dominant peacebuilding discourses to be found in the sphere of NGOs is even 
enhanced through the donor frameworks they are situated in. As most NGOs are 
funded by international donors, they have had to adapt to the requirements of their 
sponsors in terms of professionalising their work, often presenting it in business 
frames and using ‘trigger words’ such as human rights, gender and so forth.37 It can 
be observed that NGO activists tend to be young and speak flawless English, thus, 
mainly out of necessity, forming their own project-oriented community. Frictions 
within this discursive community are not usually expected as their narratives are 
based on a jargon that is needed to attract funds – although often not out of choice, 
but out of necessity.
 38
  
At the same time, civil society as an organisational tool is not necessarily 
deeply rooted in Bosnian history. Accounting for the externalised character of civil 
society in BiH, Pugh suggests that it is impossible to create trust and positive 
relationships in civil society from an external stance.
39
 Seligman relates to Eastern 
                                                        
35
 Cf. http://www.mreza-mira.net/ (accessed 11/10/12).  
36
 Nebojsa Savija-Valha, various affiliations, personal interview, Sarajevo 12/03/09. 
37
 Various confidential sources, personal interviews, Sarajevo, Mostar and Travnik, March 2010 and 
February 2011. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Michael Pugh, “The Social-Civil Dimension”, in Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, ed. Michael 
Pugh (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 112-33, pp.121, 122. 
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Europe more specifically, arguing that, since societal interests in many Eastern 
European countries have historically been subordinated to the state, the concept of 
civil society in that region is lacking in substantial value.
40
 Civil society, despite its 
attempts to distance itself from donor regulations, is often perceived as a donor 
instrument and are thus situated in close relation to the imagined community of 
international actors in BiH. They do not tend to be viewed as a locally grown set of 
actors, nor as a tool through which Bosnians would tend to make their voices heard.
41
 
A staff member of the Nansen Dialogue Centre in Mostar, for instance, suggested that 
as an NGO, it is sometimes difficult to make a difference as problems are deeply 
rooted in communities.
42
 This statement in turn implies a detachment of the NGO 
sphere from local communities and points to the problems NGOs face when 
attempting to translate local grievances into donor-attractive policies.  
Not only are there frictions between them and local communities, but partly 
also with international actors. In a number of cases have civil society actors made 
efforts to achieve their own goals as detached from what the international community 
expects.
43
 Just to quote one specific example: the Helsinki Committee for Human 
Rights, based in Sarajevo, has emphasised the desire to develop its own human rights 
initiatives as opposed to building on the project outlines as international actors 
propose them.
44
 Again, this example reflects the extent to which civil society actors 
are, partly intentionally, partly by necessity, focused on their own community rather 
than on the surrounding communities. Their work is largely de-politicised and 
therefore isolated from the ethnic divisions that may otherwise divide them 
horizontally.
45
 This focus creates a certain degree of stability within those circles, 
while at the same time perpetuating frictional peacebuilding between local, state, 
NGO and international communities. 
 
The local population 
                                                        
40
 Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: The Free Press, 1992), pp.6f. 
41
 Cf. Stefanie Kappler, “Liberal Peacebuilding’s Representation of the Local: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, in Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism, eds. Oliver 
Richmond and Audra Mitchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), pp.260-76. 
42
 Elvir Djuliman, NDC Mostar, personal interview, Mostar, 15/04/10. 
43
 Nebojsa Savija-Valha, Ambrosia, personal interview, Sarajevo, 23/03/10. 
44
 Srdan Dizdarevic, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, personal interview, Sarajevo, 10/03/08. 
45
 Cf. Hans-Martin Jaeger, ““Global Civil Society” and the Political Depoliticization of Global 
Governance”, International Political Sociology 1, no.3 (2007): 257-277. 
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Similar dynamics are at play in the ways in which the local population are 
viewed and imagined externally. There seems to be a tendency among international 
actors to refer to Bosnians, sometimes as one, but mostly as one or three local 
homogenous groups. The Dayton Peace Agreement itself reflects the assumption that 
the three ethnic majority groups, i.e. Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, can be represented 
as a more or less unitary group, thus setting the tone for how local society is portrayed 
politically. Again, we can observe tendencies for local communities to be represented 
as part of one community. This is linked to the aim of many international agencies to 
reconcile horizontal divides rather than addressing vertical frictions. The World Bank, 
for instance, praises itself for achieving unified licence plates across the country, thus 
allowing for a greater freedom of movement.
46
 Along similar lines, the EU is 
interested in clear boundaries around imagined communities, basing its approaches to 
policy-making on a triangle between the EU – local authorities – local civil society.47 
This triangle in turn presupposes coherence within its elements, pushing for clear 
boundaries and the elimination of frictions within them.  
 
 
What the analysis of the various imagined communities in BiH shows is the 
limited amount of official translation of needs vertically. There certainly is a high 
degree of corruption and clientelism
48
 as well as cooperation between civil society 
organisations and donors, while at the same time, vertical links of cooperation are 
dominated by horizontal links. Groups of actors situated in different power positions 
appear to have a frictional relationship with each other, they often perceive their 
identities as mutually exclusive (e.g. ‘if you are local, you should not work for the 
international community’: or: ‘the political community is not interested in the needs 
of ordinary citizens’) and their productive encounter is limited in terms of their 
mutual hybridisation. The lack of a shared language (in terms of national language as 
much as the ways in which experiences are framed) further inhibits communication 
and interaction between imagined communities. In this context, it has been pointed 
out to me that the language the EU uses is not connected to people’s everyday lives, 
with terms such as ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘democratisation’ remaining meaningless 
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beyond their institutional context.
49
 The perception that the international community 
remains distant from local experiences can be said to be particularly strong outside 
Sarajevo, the capital city. In Banja Luka, which is more than six hours by bus from 
Sarajevo, people described the extent to which they felt excluded and distanced from 
the politics of the international community.
50
 Given that most international 
organisations have their headquarters in the capital city (with a few exceptions such as 
the OHR or the OSCE who do operate beyond Sarajevo), connections between non-
metropolitan actors and international actors remain a rarity and geographical frictions 
are common. 
This is, however, not to say that there are no vertical connections whatsoever. 
Gariwo, for instance, an NGO working for civil courage, has organised meetings 
between students and international ambassadors, aiming to establish links of 
communication between those individuals.
51
 At the same time, those bridges can only 
be found sporadically, failing to reach across wide societal and political sectors. 
International peacebuilding seems to have reinforced rather than challenged the 
horizontalisation of political communities. 
 
Against this background, the following section will contrast the situation in 
BiH with the ways in which vertical communities are formed and imagined in South 
Africa.  
 
Horizontal frictions and Verticalisation in South Africa 
 
While the example of BiH reflects deeply engrained vertical lines of friction, 
the following section will present the case of South Africa as a community landscape, 
not exclusively, but predominantly shaped by horizontal frictions and vertical 
cooperation. This has to be seen in the context of South Africa’s recent history and 
particularly the era of apartheid and the struggle against it, both deeply engrained in 
the living memory of South Africans. That memory seems to be mainly shaped by 
frictions between different ethnic groups – most notable between Black, White and 
Coloured people, but also including a variety of other groups represented in what is 
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often referred to as a ‘rainbow nation’. The transition from a radically segregated 
system of apartheid to democracy has turned what seemed to be an ethnic conflict into 
a conflict about access to power and resources.
52
 Against this background, 
peacebuilding in South Africa has to be seen in the light of its recent transition to 
democracy, limited international intervention, an emphasis on reconciliation as well 
as the role of civil society organisations in service delivery in a context of inequalities 
and poverty.
53
 The themes of resource distribution and transitional justice have indeed 
become the leitmotifs along the lines of which peacebuilding is imagined and 
structured in South Africa.
54
 
It can be said that, historically speaking, in South Africa there are groups 
sharing ideas and norms that transcend vertical/ hierarchical structures. It has been 
pointed out that “we all know each other. We were part of the same struggle, on either 
side”.55 In that sense, the fact that South African history is shaped by a multitude of 
cleavages other than along lines of political hierarchy has contributed to the 
emergence of constantly changing lines of friction along a number of alternative lines, 
including class, geographical location, skin colour and so forth. The frictions between 
the formerly governing white elites and the oppression of the black majority can be 
said to have been transformative, resulting in violent and non-violent forms of 
resistance and finally resulting in the overthrow of the apartheid system in 1994.  
 
Selective vertical cooperation 
 
In the process of transition to democracy, which, as opposed to the case of 
Bosnia, resulted from internal pressures, the presence of international actors has been 
rather sporadic, and a real sense of an ‘international community’ has not really 
developed until today. Instead, most international actors present in the country engage 
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in their very own agendas without necessarily linking them to each other. The World 
Bank, for instance, focuses on research on poverty and inequality of opportunity,
56
 
while the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is engaged in the fields of 
governance, human rights, environmental sustainability, poverty reduction, HIV and 
crisis management.
57
 The EU itself has only a rather limited role, particularly in 
comparison with its involvement in BiH, and tends to focus on trade as well as 
partnership agreements on a contractual basis.  
Due to this rather lose connection between different agencies, South African 
institutions have started to engage with international donors according to their needs 
and perhaps more selectively than in BiH. This allows for a tough, but flexible 
approach to funding and project cooperation and is useful for local agencies as they 
can thus circumvent conditionalities they would otherwise be confronted with. 
Against this background, the City at Peace project, based in Cape Town, has decided 
to work with a number of international funders and their projects according to what 
they perceive as their needs. For instance, cooperation takes place with the Forum 
Theatre, also active in Palestine, as well as with the Global Youth City Project, which 
reaches into communities in Burma, Guatemala, Norway and so forth. All these 
countries have sent partners for joint programme development with City at Peace.
58
 
This is but one example which reflects selective connections between local and 
international agents, according to the needs and ambitions of the respective actor. At 
the same time, there are more institutionalised forms of cooperation across levels, 
with the Dialogue Facility in the context of the SA-EU Strategic Partnership 
programme representing an attempt to institutionalise vertical links.
59
 In their attempts 
to connect South African actors from civil society as well as political and academic 
spheres with the EU, the Dialogue Facility clearly tries to break up boundaries 
between different sets of actors. Along similar lines, the Cape Town-based Centre for 
Conflict Resolution addresses a large target audience, including local councillors, 
church leaders, schools and community leaders.
60
 The inclusion of different sets of 
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actors as well as the attempt to establish structures of accountability between them 
can in turn be said to strengthen vertical links and to create vertical imagined 
communities – at least on a project-base, if not beyond. Imagined communities thus 
seem to be common, sporadic, flexible and needs-based. 
 
Horizontal frictions 
 
One of the main reasons why vertical links seem more likely than in BiH is the 
fact that there are more horizontal frictions and divisions. The divisions within 
government itself are by no means a new phenomenon,
61
 but have recently been 
highlighted by the violence triggered by the Marikana mine strike and the police 
responses to it. Not only did the strike and the responses to it trigger nation-wide 
debates about resource distribution, social justice and the associated normative 
underpinnings of politics, but it has also cast light on the fragile horizontal links 
across government. The expulsion of Julius Malema, the youth leader of the ANC, 
from his political party in April 2012 is thus symbolic of those controversial debates 
reaching across the country
62
 as well as the rapidly-changing nature of alliances and 
frictions. At the same time, these frictions within government have opened channels 
through which grassroots actors have been able to enter political debates and to have 
an influence on political elites. In this context, it is particularly striking to see the 
extent to which even the most deprived sections of society are entering political 
debates.  The shack dwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo is but one powerful 
example of a way in which marginalised sections of the population can become very 
political. The movement has been fighting against eviction campaigns from their 
settlement and launched a number of campaigns challenging government policies.
63
 
As one of the former organisers explained, there was much political activism 
involved.
64
 He also pointed to the fragmentation of government, suggesting that the 
associated “political confusion” reflects “the true sense of who we are”.65 In that 
respect, the dissatisfaction with the government and its internal divisions have led to 
attempts to challenge the ANC from inside, in terms of building on those divisions to 
                                                        
61
 Cf. Geoffrey Hawker, “Political Leadership in the ANC: The South African Provinces 1994-1999”, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 38, no. 4 (2000): 631-658. 
62
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19536522 (accessed 17/10/12). 
63
 Mzonke Poni, Abahlali baseMjondolo, personal interview, Khayelitsha, 30/08/10. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Ibid. 
 18 
achieve political change.
66
 Along similar lines, the township “Malawi Town” is very 
politicised, fighting for their rights by challenging political strategies openly.
67
 
Although conditions of the township seem very adverse regarding political activism 
due to its geographical marginalisation as well as the lack of public transport to take 
people to political venues (such as Town Hall), local leaders have repeatedly sought 
conversation with the local political elites.
68
 This also holds true for the Khulumani 
Support Group, making the grievances of those marginalised from the truth and 
reconciliation processes heard to politicians.
69
 
It becomes obvious that these strategies only work in a political landscape in 
which actors are vertically linked and in communication with each other – in 
whichever way. This can also be considered one of the reasons for which Abigail’s 
Women’s Movement was able to start its engagement with the most marginalised 
sections of the township Khayelitsha from nothing, while eventually obtaining the 
support of the Ministry of Social Development.
70
 What started as a few women caring 
for elderly and handicapped people could thus become a caring centre.
71
  
At the same time, these cross-level connections and thus emerging sporadic 
vertical imagined communities can to a certain extent also be found in the work done 
by museums. The latter seem to perceive an increasing interest in their work on the 
part of politicians. The Iziko Slave Lodge is one example where the museum pointed 
to the issue of empowerment of the Khoi (a South African ethnic group), which was 
thereafter integrated with the political agenda on a nation-wide basis.
72
 In a similar 
vein, the Gender Equity Unit at the University of the Western Cape has started to 
engage in political activism beyond its direct mandate at the university. Through their 
submissions to the government, the unit has, according to its director, impacted upon 
the legal status of women as well as their rights and equality.
73
 Therefore, instead of 
exclusively cooperating with gender units across the country, they have decided to 
lobby vertically, both upwards and downwards. With respect to the latter, the theatre 
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project co-coordinated by the Gender Equity Unit aims to establish contact with the 
grassroots of society in terms of engaging a broad audience. Not only do new students 
perform in this project every year, but they also bring their families to the 
performances, which critically reflect social and political issues in South Africa.
74
 The 
open nature of this project as well as its outreach into wide sectors of society – 
including people who would not normally have attended theatre events – reflects a 
strong connection between the grassroots and civil society. The Bonfire Theatre is 
another example in which different sets of actors are linked across societal spheres, as 
the company addresses a broad audience, including business people, refugees, 
children and so forth with the aim to integrate communities at all levels.
75
 Unlike the 
situation in BiH, where civil society seems distant from local society, there seems to 
be a stronger integration between South African civil society organisations and their 
surrounding society, whose needs are often at the base of civic and political 
engagement. Civil society as a whole seems much less integrated and coordinated 
than in Bosnia, while the overall civil society landscape is more fragmented. This is a 
result of South African NGOs working with different agendas that they derive from 
local contexts, as the examples of Abigail’s Women’s Movement or the Gender Equity 
Unit illustrate. Due to the fact that those organisations are located in the midst of their 
recipient communities, they are born out of the specific needs of the latter rather than 
strictly adhering with donor agendas. This certainly also has a less positive side in that 
the interests of a number of grassroots organisations are competing with each other, 
thus producing horizontal frictions. In that sense, politics is about securing one’s 
share of resources in a context of scarcity and competition. On the other hand, the 
politicisation of the ‘everyday’ brings the benefit of including those traditionally 
excluded from elite-level politics. These processes of inclusion are in turn facilitated 
by a number of ‘translators’, i.e. actors who establish vertical links and remove 
frictions between actors. One example would be the Apartheid Museum in 
Johannesburg in its attempts to involve the local community and particularly young 
people in their rather political work.
76
 In a similar vein, the Medical Research Council 
at the University of South Africa undertakes research on identities emerging at 
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grassroots level and tries to make their findings heard to policy-makers.
77
 As 
researchers in the institution highlighted, there have indeed been policy-relevant 
reforms in the field of health as a result of the dialogue between the institute and 
policy-makers.
78
 Generally, compared to the horizontalised landscape of imagined 
communities in BiH, South Africa seems to have stronger links between researchers 
and policy-makers.
 79 
Although not friction-free, it can be said that there is a clear 
awareness of grassroots demands towards the government, including the most 
pressing issues such as poverty, unemployment and so forth,
80
 not least as a result of 
the work of ‘translators’ as outlined above.  
 
Verticality: Limiting and Empowering 
 
At the same time, the situation must not be glorified as the fragmentation of 
horizontal political landscapes equally reflects divisions along the lines of ethnicity, 
class and so forth. The vertical orientation of politics must also be seen in the context 
of South Africa’s patrimonial heritage81, which favours vertical structures of 
accountability in exchange for votes and includes structures of clientelism at its base. 
As a township elder pointed out, politicians mainly enter in contact with the shack 
dwellers in his community before elections are due.
82
 Against this background, it can 
be argued that vertical imagined communities are not naturally more peaceful than 
horizontal ones, but what the South African example shows is their ability to generate 
more flexibility in the political landscape. Change may thus happen spontaneously 
and can lead to sudden outbreaks of violence, which the Marikana mine incident 
mirrored very clearly. However, the instability of the system equally allows for the 
development of powerful vertical communication channels and thus creates more 
leeway to deal with political challenges.  In this primarily vertical culture of politics, 
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events involving multiple actors seem to be more common than in BiH. The launch of 
Fr Michael Lapsley’s book in Cape Town was rather illustrative of this, attracting a 
large number of ‘ordinary’ people, but also Desmond Tutu, the mayor of Cape Town 
and a variety of media and civil society activists.
83
 It was in this venue that a political 
discussion about social justice was had, where speakers discussed the past and future 
of South Africa as well as linking this to people’s everyday experiences of peace and 
social (in)justice. The willingness to engage in discussions about pressing social 
topics may partly be viewed as a legacy of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC), which involved different levels of society and initiated a cross-societal debate 
about politics in their most traumatising form. This is not to romanticise the TRC as it 
has been subject to critiques questioning its lack of clarity of its findings,
84
 its 
ambiguous use of the concept of reconciliation
85
 its limits in terms of wider impact, 
86
 
its inability to deliver reparations to most people adversely affected by apartheid 
policies
87
, as well as its tendencies to over-privilege white and previously powerful 
people.
88
 At the same time, the TRC may have laid the institutional grounding for 
cooperation across sets of actors and thus the formation of dynamic vertical imagined 
communities. In that sense, the TRC may have seeded the foundations on the basis of 
which frictional peacebuilding emerged in the South African context. Referring to the 
TRC, Shaw indeed suggests that a “new paradigm for transitional justice had been 
created, and awaited its own frictional travels to other parts of the world.”89 
 
 
Conclusion 
Without a direct comparison, the snapshot on those two cases reflects the 
extent to which the nature of frictional lines between imagined socio-political 
communities impacts upon the ways in which conflict is constantly (re-)produced in a 
                                                        
83
 Launch of Michael Lapsley’s book ‘Redeeming the Past’, Cape Town, 03/09/12.  
84
 Piers Pigou, “There Are More Truths to be Uncovered before We Can Achieve Reconciliation,” 
Sunday Independent, 23 April 2006 
8585
 Tristan A. Borer, “Reconciling South Africa or South Africans? Cautionary Notes from the TRC”, 
African Studies Quarterly 8, no.1 (2004): 19-38. 
86
 Catherine M. Cole, “Performance, Transitional Justice, and the Law: South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission”, Theatre Journal 59 (2007): 167-187, p.174. 
87
 Shirley Gunn, Human Rights Media Centre, personal interview, Cape Town, 07/12/12. 
88
 Audrey R. Chapman and Patrick Ball, “The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from 
Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala”, Human Rights Quarterly 23, no.1 (2001): 1-43, pp.8, 9. 
89
 Rosalind Shaw, “Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra 
Leone”, The International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 183-207, quote at p.193. 
 22 
landscape of agency. The thus emerging multi-dimensional picture of frictions casts 
light on the complex political constellations found in each society. However, it may 
come as a surprise that peacebuilding actors have only rarely investigated the nature 
of friction, instead aiming to eliminate frictions as such. This approach has neglected 
the constructive potential frictions may have. The horizontalisation of the Bosnian 
socio-political landscape seems to prevent flexibility and socio-political 
transformation on the one hand. On the other hand, horizontal links are contributing to 
strong links within communities, often in families and neighbourhood circles. Vertical 
links are present, but seem to be less dominant in the political system. In contrast, 
South African communities seem to develop vertically, thus allowing for political 
flexibility and the vocalisation of local needs. At the same time, the vertical friction in 
Bosnia implies limited connections between grassroots, civil society, politicians and 
the international community, while these very connections and their instability in 
South Africa signify a higher risk of political explosion. What this reflects is the 
double-edged nature of friction. Not only is it important to analyse its locality and 
directionality (horizontal, vertical, or both) and multi-dimensionality, but also its 
quality in terms of what sorts of effects it may produce. Frictional peacebuilding may 
in fact lead to fragmentation and exclusion, but it can also facilitate empowerment 
and selective inclusion along new lines of the socio-political landscape. As the 
example of South Africa has shown, quickly changing lines of friction can be risky 
and lead to a volatile political environment. Yet they can also grant access of more 
voices to the policy-making process, which, in the case of BiH, seems rather limited. 
Bosnian socio-political life presents itself as primarily horizontally stratified, which 
may produce more stability in the political system. However, this stability can be 
considered an uncomfortable and often exclusive stalemate for many citizens who are 
not represented in the political networks that are politically influential. If 
peacebuilding actors are to understand not only the local context in which they 
operate, but also the ways in which their own role impacts upon the mutual 
relationships between different actors, the directionality and quality of frictions in the 
socio-political landscape are key to understanding the dynamics and transformative 
impacts of intervention.   
